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Abstract
Recent advances in networking technology have in-
creased the potential for dynamic enterprise collaborations
between an open set of entities on a global scale. The se-
curity of these collaborations is a major concern, and re-
quires novel approaches suited to this new environment to
be developed. Trust management appears to be a promising
approach. Due to the dynamic nature of these collabora-
tions, dynamism in the formation, evolution and exploita-
tion of trust is essential. In this paper we explore the prop-
erties of trust dynamics in this context. Trust is formed
and evolves according to personal experience and recom-
mendations. The properties of trust dynamics are expressed
through a formal model of trust. Specific examples, based
on an e-purse application scenario are used to demonstrate
these properties.
1. Introduction
In the future, there is likely to be increased use of the
Internet and other wide area networks to provide a basis
for collaboration between large numbers of diverse enter-
prise systems. To take advantage of the whole range of pos-
sibilities such a global computing environment creates for
enterprise systems, it is essential to provide support for au-
tonomous decision-making by its constituent entities. These
entities must operate without the benefit of central control,
with partial knowledge of the whole system and without re-
liance on a central security infrastructure inside unfamiliar
administrative domains.
In this paper, the view is taken that the process of
decision-making involves the estimation of likely be-
haviour; something not explicitly catered for by tradi-
tional security measures which focus on the identifica-
tion/authentication of principals involved in an interaction.
In addition to this unsuitable (for our purposes) focus on
identity, the hard coded approach to centrally managed se-
curity domains is inflexible for environments with unpre-
dictable composition; thus the responsibility falls to the en-
tities themselves to make security related decisions to pro-
tect their resources from misuse by others and ensure pay-
ment is received for resource use.
The prediction of behaviour is very complex, particularly
when consideration is given to the human mechanism for
achieving this, specifically trust. This complex notion [6]
has been studied extensively in sociological fields and some
attempts have been made to establish its computational rep-
resentation [8, 9], although most of these have fallen short
of the various definitions intuitive to humans.
The aim of the SECURE [10] project is to define a com-
putational model for trust-based decision making for the
environments described above, which adheres to the com-
monly accepted characteristics of human trust [4]. Within
this paper the approach adopted by SECURE is outlined,
focusing on the use of trust information to provide dynamic
trust evaluation, examining in particular a scenario from the
project, the e-purse [2].
1.1. The E-purse Scenario
The scenario involves the use of an e-purse when inter-
acting with a bus company. The purpose of the electronic
purse is to hold a relatively small amount of electronic cash
(in this scenario the e-purse is limited to 100 euro) that the
owner can use as if it were real cash for buying bus tickets.
The user can refill the e-purse when it is empty by contact-
ing his/her bank. There are three different parties (princi-
pals) involved in the e-purse scenario: the user (owner) of
the e-purse, the bus company, and the bank. For the purpose
of this paper we are interested in modelling the relationship
between the bus company and the user, taking the exam-
ple interaction when users want to purchase a ticket using
their e-purse. We focus on this aspect of the relationship as
it highlights certain advantages for modelling the dynamics
of trust as will become apparent later on in the paper.
E-cash is based on a protocol that, although protects user
anonymity during normal transactions, enables identifica-
tion of guilty parties in fraudulent transactions. Every time
the bus company accepts e-cash in a transaction it takes the
risk of losing money due to fraud. Therefore, for the bus
company to decide how to respond to a purchasing request,
it needs to determine the trustworthiness of the user. Prin-
cipals can assign different levels of trust to different entities
based on the available information so as to evaluate the level
of risk a transaction involving the user entails.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2
describes the trust-risk model of SECURE focusing mainly
on the trust model. Section 3 analyzes principles for how
trust is formed, evolved, and exploited, giving examples
from the e-purse scenario. Section 4 concludes with dis-
cussion and examination of open issues.
2. The SECURE Model
The approach taken is based around the premise that trust
and risk are inexorably linked and must both be considered
when taking a decision about an ambiguous path, the out-
come of which depends on the actions of another entity. At
the heart of our approach lies the formal trust model [3] and
risk model [1].
2.1. The SECURE Trust Model
Most existing systems follow the approach of binary
trust values, which restricts the expression of trust to a cer-
tain degree (trusted or non-trusted). A finer granularity of
trust values enables a wider variety of trust evolution strate-
gies to be considered. For this reason, and since our aim is
to follow human intuition on trust, we consider here more
comprehensive and informative trust values. In the trust
model, trust is expressed as a mapping (m) from pairs of
principals (P) to trust information (T):
m : P → P → T
The trust model represents trust values as elements of
a domain forming a complete lattice (i.e. a partial order-
ing where every subset has a greatest lower and least upper
bound). Using such a lattice of values, it is possible to as-
sociate more than just one exact value with a principal. We
can associate a non-empty subset of trust values in the form
of a closed interval on the lattice, whereby our trust in a
principal could be any value within the associated interval,
although we cannot be more precise given the information
available.
As intervals are used, methods for comparing them are
required. For this purpose, two orderings on the set of possi-
ble intervals for a lattice of trust values are defined to allow
us to compare trustworthiness (trust ordering) and precision
of the information (trust information ordering) carried in the
trust interval. Intuitively, the trust ordering allows compar-
ison of intervals by comparing the interval bounds on the
original trust value lattice. The trust information ordering
can be seen as allowing higher precision to be represented
as a subset relationship between intervals.
The trust ordering allows the definition of a new lattice
of the intervals from the original trust value lattice. Sim-
ilarly, the trust information ordering allows the definition
of a complete partial ordering (i.e. a partial ordering with a
least element) of these intervals, with the interval consisting
of the full trust value lattice as the bottom element, repre-
senting the unknown trust in an unknown principal. The
narrower the interval, the fewer possible trust values we
have; thus an interval consisting of exactly one value im-
plies a very precise opinion of trust.
Local trust policies are defined for each principal, which
determine which interval to associate with other known
principals. These local policies support trust based on col-
lected evidence, in the form of personal observations of past
interactions and recommendations from other entities. An-
other important feature of these policies is the ability to del-
egate decisions about the trustworthiness of entities to other
principals. The difference between recommendation and
delegation is that we delegate to principals similar to our-
selves (e.g. the bus company might delegate to some other
bus companies); however, in recommendation we gather
trust information from all the principals in the application
domain (e.g. recommendations about users from banks, bus
companies and other users). Furthermore, recommenda-
tions are weighted according to the trust in the source as
a recommender, whereas delegation is merely accepted, as
the delegated trust interval comes from an implicitly trusted
source. Note that the entities we delegate to may further
delegate to other entities, forming long delegation chains.
The local policies (denoted pi) are expressed in a for-
mal policy language, and although a brief example is given
here, it is not important for an understanding of this paper.
For further details, the interested reader is referred to [3].
Let us assume that we have two bus companies C1 and C2,
and each bus company has a list of registered users (users
that have weekly or monthly tickets), then an example trust
policy of C1 could be that “if user u is one of our regis-
tered users, evaluate his/her trustworthiness using the rele-
vant stored evidence, otherwise delegate to C2”. This can
be expressed in the policy language as follows:
pi = (registeredTo(u) = C1) ⇒ [e0, e1]; dC2e
where registeredTo() is a function that returns the bus com-
pany that a user is registered to, [e0, e1] is the trust value
interval for user u according to collected evidence and d e
represents delegation.
2.2. The SECURE Risk Model
After obtaining a trust interval for the principal, it can
be exploited to make a decision about the request for in-
teraction. This is achieved through the process of risk as-
sessment, outlined briefly here, with further detail available
in [1].
In general, the lower the trust in an entity, the higher the
risk in the interaction is perceived to be. Each application
incorporating the SECURE model will identify a number
of actions, each with a number of independent possible out-
comes. Each of these outcomes will have a range of possible
costs and benefits, which can be represented as a cost proba-
bility density function (cost-PDF). The trust interval for the
specific principal determines the probabilities within each
cost-PDF. The cost-PDFs for each outcome are combined
to represent the likelihood of an interaction with a specific
principal incurring a specific cost or benefit. This informa-
tion can then be used, in conjunction with some notion of
utility, to provide information for the decision making pro-
cess.
2.3. The Trust Lifecycle
The trust and risk models are combined within an ar-
chitecture that allows for trust lifecycle management. The
trust lifecycle is the collective term for the dynamic aspects
of how trust is formed, how trust evolves over time due to
available information and how trust can be exploited. These
aspects are important in striving for an intuitive, flexible
model of trust. The architecture and issues relating to this
are described in previous work by the authors [5].
For the purpose of this paper, the important feature of
the architecture is the repository used to collect trust in-
formation (evidence). There are two main sources of this
information, which allow us to dynamically form an opin-
ion about another entity. Personal observations of the en-
tity’s behaviour, through recording of outcomes of interac-
tions, are essential for the subjective evaluation of trustwor-
thiness. Recommendations from trusted third parties pro-
vide the possibility for trust regarding unknown entities to
be propagated to provide supporting evidence for decisions.
The process of recommendation becomes more important
in cases where we have no personal experience with the
entity in question, allowing us to consider interacting with
unknown entities. In the case of recommendations, the rec-
ommenders give their trust interval regarding some other
principal.
Evaluating the trustworthiness of a principal includes
both trust formation and evolution. Formation differs from
evolution in that additional evidence might be actively
sought for formation, while evolution refers to the process
of changing one’s estimation of trust based on stored evi-
dence. In human terms, people tend to treat evidence from
personal experience in a different manner to evidence from
recommendations. For this reason it is important that these
two types of evidence are treated separately.
The model introduces dynamism because trust evolves as
evidence becomes available, dynamically adapting our trust
in principals. In this paper we focus on the dynamics of trust
information, presenting a set of principles upon which new
evidence can be taken into account, to update trust intervals
as additional information becomes available either through
recommendation or observation. We model the effect new
evidence has on the current stored trust interval through the
introduction of the notion of a pulling force.
The following section describes the principles, on which
the processing of trust information depends, which in con-
junction with the model outlined above supports the dy-
namic evolution of trust.
3. Trust Dynamics for the SECURE Model
The focus of this section of the paper is how to estimate
trustworthiness of an entity from evidence. The general
principles are first examined before giving a concrete ex-
ample of how these principles can be applied in the e-purse
scenario.
3.1. Principles of Trust Formation and Evolution
Trust formation and evolution, although differing in
some respects, both involve altering the current estimation
of trustworthiness (trust interval) with respect to some new
piece of evidence. As the current trust interval represents all
trust evidence so far, this is akin to updating the summary
of all known trust information about the principal. Initially
entities have no evidence of past behaviour of unknowns to
establish a base for interaction, thus allocating the full lat-
tice of trust values as a trust interval.
Given the current trust interval based on observations
(Tobs) and a new piece of evidence we dynamically evalu-
ate a new trust interval that reflects Tobs and the effect of the
piece of evidence. In all cases, the effect of new evidence
is to move the current interval closer to it (or at least no fur-
ther away from it), giving a new interval that better reflects
both. This is the intuition behind the concept of pulling
force exerted by a piece of evidence. We shall examine the
two kinds of evidence, observations and recommendations,
which have different characteristics and thus differing prin-
ciples.
Observations of the outcomes of interactions are evalu-
ated against the expected behaviour of the principal. The
expected behaviour can be established as a result of the risk
assessment process that led to the decision to carry out the
interaction in question. The evaluated observations are re-
ferred to as experiences [7]. There exists a range of experi-
ence values that reflects the effect of an observed outcome
on Tobs. These values are ordered and are classified into two
sets, a trust positive and a trust negative one. Every new ex-
perience exerts a pulling force on Tobs, which will move it
lower or higher, depending on the class of the experience.
The actual choice of experience values will be application
dependent and may be complex since it is dependent on the
type of cost/benefit involved.
To relate the experience value to the expected behaviour
of the user, a mapping of experience values to the range
of trust values is introduced to allow comparison with trust
intervals. The assumption is that the loss or gain during a
transaction, represented by the experience value, provides
further information about the user’s actual trustworthiness.
As a result, the position of the new mapped experience value
relative to Tobs determines how the pulling force affects the
bounds as follows: In all cases the force will pull the bounds
of the interval closer to the value.
Note that, if the new experience value is inside the in-
terval, then the result of the force will be a more precise
interval, while if the new experience value is outside the
interval, then the result of the force will be to pull the inter-
val towards the value potentially resulting in reduced preci-
sion. The force determines both the direction of the bounds
movement as well as the level of movement, i.e. a stronger
force causes greater movement, although the exact distance
of movement is application specific. The movement could
be done in steps, the granularity of which is determined by
the individual entity. Additionally, each entity may require
a certain number of experiences, an experience count, to be
kept before a movement is allowed. This feature incorpo-
rates some notion of the entity’s disposition, similar to the
principles of slow and fast trust dynamics described in [7].
As mentioned above, recommendations may be used to
provide further information particularly when the precision
of Tobs is considered insufficient. The interval encodes
some measure of precision of the estimation of trustwor-
thiness, incorporating the notion of weighting recommen-
dation according to the recommender’s precision of estima-
tion. This relies on the assumption that an entity behaves
in the same way towards all entities (uniform behaviour as-
sumption). This assumption affects the way recommenda-
tions are taken into account. Since the main reason for using
recommendations is to improve the precision of our estima-
tion, imprecise recommendations could be discarded as they
provide little additional information. The decision, though,
on this issue is left to the individual entity.
An important property of any function that combines rec-
ommendations is to provide the same results regardless of
the order in which the recommendations are considered. It
is possible that the recommendations may have a shelf life
to enable those that are out of date to be discarded. This
might be the reason for incorporating a notion of time into
our model, but does not affect the requirement of order in-
dependence. In any case, it is unlikely we will be able to
determine the exact time at which the recommender calcu-
lated this estimate.
Recommendations are in general treated in a similar
manner to experiences, by evaluating the pulling force that
each one of them exerts on Tobs. The pulling force of each
recommendation depends on how it compares to Tobs:
• Conflicting recommendation (i.e. a recommended in-
terval with no overlap with Tobs). Because of the uni-
form behaviour assumption a conflicting recommenda-
tion is taken as an indication that our estimation might
be incorrect. As a result, it will lead to a reduction
in the precision of Tobs and a movement towards the
recommendation.
• Partially conflicting recommendation (i.e. a recom-
mendation interval with partial overlap with Tobs). In
this case the recommendation will move Tobs towards
the direction of the overlap.
• Non-conflicting recommendation (i.e. a recommenda-
tion interval fully overlapping with Tobs). In this case
there are two sub-cases. If the recommendation in-
cludes Tobs, then it does not offer any additional in-
formation and it is discarded. If Tobs includes the rec-
ommendation then the precision of Tobs is improved.
The pulling force of a recommendation is inversely pro-
portionate to the precision of Tobs and proportionate to the
precision of the recommendation itself. At the same time,
because of the uniform behaviour assumption, the pulling
force of a recommendation is also proportionate to its dis-
tance from Tobs, i.e. the further away the recommendation
the more doubtful we are of our current estimation. The in-
dividual pulling forces from the recommendations are com-
bined, resulting in an overall pulling force, which, in prac-
tice, will have a separate effect on each bound of Tobs. As
with observations, it is possible to incorporate the trust dy-
namics disposition of an entity in the application specific
formulae, to incorporate a notion of how easily influenced
it is by recommendations in general.
This section has outlined the principles according to
which trust intervals are formed and evolved with new ex-
periences or recommendations. The following section gives
an example of how these principles might be applied to the
e-purse scenario.
3.2. Applying the Principles: the E-Purse Scenario
3.2.1 Formation and Evolution. In the e-purse example
the range of possible trust values is [0, 100] reflecting the
amount of e-cash that will be accepted from the requesting
user, leaving the remainder of the ticket price to be paid in
cash. The use of such a range of trust values simplifies the
decision making process for this scenario.
For observations in the e-purse scenario, the experience
value range is [-100, 100] denoting the maximum gain or
loss in a transaction due to the limit on the e-purse. In
this case it is convenient to represent experience values as
the direct measure of cost or benefit derived from the inter-
action; obviously a complex function could be substituted.
The trust interval is mapped to the range of experience val-
ues to represent the user’s trustworthiness as expected loss
or gain during a transaction involving him/her. The size of
movement is determined by the individual entity’s trust dy-
namics disposition.
Given a set of recommended trust intervals of the form
[Ri, R′i], on the same range of possible trust values [D,D′]
(0 to 100 as mentioned above) and the current observation
based trust interval Tobs = [O,O′], the combined pulling
force is the sum of the individual pulling force from each
of the recommendations. The pulling force on each bound
of Tobs is different depending on the position of the recom-
mendation. If we denote L as the combined pulling force on



















where N is the number of recommendations.
The sign of these combined pulling forces determines the
direction of movement of each bound and their value could
be used to determine their relative effect. So assuming the
lower bound O moves by some amount m, the movement of
the upper bound would be (U/L)m.
It is necessary to limit the value of m, so that the re-
sulting bounds still determine an interval and remain within
the range of trust values. As L and U are signed, there are
four cases (aside from the case of forces being zero where
there is no movement caused by recommendation), which
will each result in different conditions (see Table 1) for the
limits of m in terms of lower bound movement (C1), upper
bound movement (C2) and convergence of bounds (C3).
The formulae in table 1 are used to determine the maxi-
mum value m can take, to determine how much the bounds
can move with respect to the pulling forces. A measure of
how susceptible the deciding entity is to recommendation
(α) is necessary. This α is dependant on the entity’s pol-
icy and represents its disposition in terms of trust dynamics.
The direction of movement is already known from U and
L, and the limit value for m is used in conjunction with α
to determine the movement of the lower bound (LM) and
upper bound (UM):
LM = αm,UM = α
∣∣∣∣UL
∣∣∣∣m
The discussion in this section focused on how to
determine the range of possible trust values to allocate
to the requesting entity. This range must then be used to
determine whether or not to grant the request, which is the
process of trust exploitation.
3.2.2 Exploitation. The essential problem in exploitation
is to determine expected behaviour on the basis of trust
intervals. In the SECURE project, this is achieved using
the trust interval to determine the risk of interacting with
a particular principal for a particular action, as described
in [1]. The calculated risk allows entities to decide whether
or not to allow the action. In the e-purse scenario, a
simplified view is taken, whereby the trust value directly
determines the amount of e-cash a bus company is willing
to accept. For example, if the price of the requested ticket
is lower than the lower bound of the trust interval then the
whole transaction amount could be paid using e-cash. If
the price of the ticket is higher than the upper bound of
the trust interval then e-cash is not accepted and the full
amount has to be paid in cash. If the price of the ticket is
within the trust interval then a percentage of the transaction
could be paid in e-cash requiring cash for the rest.
4. Discussion and Open Issues
We have explored the dynamic aspects of trust using as
an example the interaction between a bus company and a
user from the e-purse scenario. This example shows how to
produce estimates of trustworthiness (intervals of trust val-
ues) from experience and how recommendations influence
these estimates. It also highlights the practical ramifica-
tions of the properties of experience and recommendation
based trust formation, evolution and exploitation in large-
scale global enterprise systems. The use of a trust-based
approach to autonomous decision making in such systems,
seems to provide a more flexible and dynamic solution com-
pared to current security approaches, and leads to interest-
ing and challenging research issues.
One such issue is that the exact format of the trust values.
Trust values are in general application dependent, thus the
format of the trust values/intervals differs from one applica-
tion to another. The values used in the example were fairly
simple, just intervals of numbers on a numerical range. In
general, this may not be the case. The trust values might not
be intervals of numerical values, but can be intervals on any
lattice of values. Moreover they could be multidimensional
structures where each dimension refers to a particular as-
pect of competence or benevolence. In addition, there may
be cases where the trust values differ even within the same
application. For example, in the e-purse scenario, the trust
intervals from the user perspective might be different from
the bus company ones. In this case, functions would have
Condition L and U both + L and U both - L+, U- L-, U+
C1 m ≤ D′ −O m ≤ O −D m ≤ D′ −O m ≤ O −D
C2 m ≤ (D′ −O′)LU m ≤ (O′ −D)LU m ≤ (D −O′)LU m ≤ (O′ −D′)LU
C3 m ≤ (O′ −O) LL−U m ≤ (O′ −O) LU−L m ≤ (O′ −O) LL−U No Convergence
where L− U > 0 where L− U > 0 where L− U > 0
Overall If L− U > 0 then If U − L < 0 then If L− U > 0 then min(C1, C2)
min(C1, C2, C3) min(C1, C2, C3) min(C1, C2, C3)
If L− U < 0 then If U − L > 0 then If L− U < 0 then
min(C1, C2) min(C1, C2) min(C1, C2)
Table 1. Conditions for m.
to be developed to allow the translation of trust values from
one format to another. A similar situation arises if we want
to use trust values between applications. This whole issue
leads to the problem of trust value contextualization. This
is a difficult problem that requires further investigation.
Another challenging issue relating to the evolution of
trust values is that the outcome might not be measurable
in monetary terms. This makes the definition of the experi-
ence value range quite tricky. So far, we assume that a mon-
etary value can be assigned to any sort of outcome, which is
in accordance with practice in industries such as insurance.
From our point of view, the only requirements on the ex-
perience value range are that its values are ordered and that
they are classified into trust positive and trust negative ones.
Of course, if the experience value range does not follow a
monetary value then the mapping of the experience values
to the trust values might be more difficult. This is another
issue that requires further investigation.
An additional issue also remains in terms of the weight-
ing of recommendations by trust in the recommender. This
is important in order to allow subjective evaluation of the
recommendations. For example, the proximity of some en-
tity’s recommendations relative to Tobs over the set of prin-
cipals, may give an indication of how reliable his/her es-
timation is. This allows us to adjust the pulling force of
a recommendation according to the reliability of the rec-
ommender. Adding this sort of weighting on the example
formulae for the e-purse application scenario is straightfor-
ward.
Our immediate plans for the future include an investi-
gation of more complex application scenarios, following
though the general principles outlined in this paper to de-
termine alternative functions and to evaluate the approach
further. It would also be beneficial to consider more com-
plex interactions between more than one principal. We are
also developing a simulation framework that will allow us
to evaluate the effect of the specific policies and functions
on enterprise collaboration.
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